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jyRIgPICTIQNAL STATEMENT
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, on December 19, 1990, Judge J. Thomas Greene, Jr., United States District
Judge for the District of Utah, certified certain questions to
this Court which the Court accepted by Order of December 21, 1990•
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The specific issues certified by Judge Greene are:
1.
Whether Utah adopts the "unavoidably unsafe
products" exception to strict products liability as set
forth in Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1965).
Subquestion A: If Utah does adopt Comment k, should
FDA approved prescription drugs be deemed as a matter of
law to have satisfied the "unavoidably unsafe" prerequisite to the Comment k exception, or should that
determination be made on a case by case basis?
Subquestion B; If Utah does adopt Comment k, and
if it is further determined that its application to FDA
approved prescription drugs ought to be made on a case
by case basis, is such determination a threshold question
for the trial court, or a question properly to be presented to the jury?
Subquestion C: If it is determined that Comment k
is to be applied to FDA approved prescription drugs on a
case by case basis, is evidence pertaining to adverse
side-effects from the drug which are not alleged to have
been personally suffered by the plaintiff relevant to
the "unavoidably unsafe" determination?
These questions present controlling but as yet unanswered issues
of law for original disposition by the Court. No decision is being
reviewed and therefore there is no applicable standard of review.
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Question 1 asks this Court whether Comment k to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A is the law of Utah.

It states:

iLt. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some
products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended

1
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and ordinary use. These are especially common in the
field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine
for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it
is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads
to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the
vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a
product, properly prepared, accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs,
vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason
cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the
prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety,
or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the
drug notwithstanding the medically recognizable risk.
The seller of such products, again with the qualification
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is
not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently
reasonable risk.
Non-case and non-statutory references which the Court will find
useful in resolving the Certified Questions, but which are not
themselves determinative of a particular issue, are filed for the
Court's convenience in a separately bound Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE QF THE CASE
This lawsuit is brought by plaintiff Ilo Marie Grundberg

individually and by plaintiff Janice Gray as personal representative
of the estate of Mildred Coats.

On June 19, 1988, Mrs. Grundberg

fired nine shots from a revolver-action handgun at her mother,
Mrs. Coats. Mrs. Coats died from the wounds inflicted by the eight
rounds which struck her.

Mrs. Grundberg sued Upjohn, alleging

that Halcion caused her to shoot her mother.

2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiffs filed suit against Upjohn on March 24, 1989,
alleging a variety of theories. A number of Counts have been dismissed and/or Upjohn has been granted summary judgment thereon,
as Upjohn has attempted to narrow the issues for the trial. Plaintiffs1 remaining liability theories include negligence and strict
liability.

Plaintiffs allege that Upjohn failed to adequately

warn about certain adverse side effects of Halcion, and that Halcion
was defectively designed.

The failure to warn claims will go to

trial on April 29, 1991, regardless how the Court answers the
questions certified to it. The strict liability in tort theory of
liability is the subject of a pending summary judgment motion.
Whether the trial court will apply strict liability in tort depends
on this Courtfs resolution of the Certified Questions.
It is agreed that the Restatement

(Second) of Torts

§ 402A, Comment k (1965), and the principles it embodies, provide
an exemption from strict liability for a claimed design defect in
the case of products which are "unavoidably unsafe". Upjohn argued
in its pending summary judgment motion that public policy supporting
the research and development of new drugs requires a holding that
all FDA-approved prescription medications are "unavoidably unsafe
products" under Comment k.

Plaintiffs argued that every lawsuit

alleging injury due to Halcion should be permitted to redetermine
whether Halcion is unavoidably unsafe and, in essence, whether the
FDA properly determined that it should be marketed because its benefits exceeded its risks. The District Court found that this issue
is a controlling question of law and certified it to this Court.

3 -
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B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS*
1.

Facts Leading Up to the Killing

In May, 1987, Mrs. Grundberg and her mother Mrs. Coats
lived in separate mobile homes in Chino Valley, Arizona.
of Ilo Grundberg, at 297).

(Depo.

Mrs. Grundberg was at that time taking

a variety of medications prescribed by her physicians to relieve
symptoms of what had been diagnosed as chronic depression and anxiety.

(Master Med. Records, mem 020; Depo. of Quentin Regestein,

Ex. 8). These drugs included anti-depressants, anti-anxiety agents
and sleeping medications.

(Regestein Depo. at Ex. 8). The record

suggests that Mrs. Grundberg took Valium consistently for nearly
17 years.

(Master Med. Records, win 081).
Halcion was first prescribed for Mrs. Grundberg on May

21, 1987.

(Grundberg Depo. at 351). Mrs. Grundberg lost her job

in December, 1987.

(Id. at 99-100).

Shortly thereafter, Mrs.

Grundberg moved her mother to Hurricane, Utah, where they lived
together in a mobile home. fid, at 378). In Hurricane, Mrs. Grundberg could find no job and her monthly bills exceeded her income,
fid, at 382-84; Plaintiffs1 Response to Fourth Request to Produce

1.
This Statement of Facts is taken in part from the statement
included in Judge Greenefs Certification Order.
Judge Greene
recognized that the parties might want to supplement the minimal
record he certified and indicated that the parties could do so if
they desired. Upjohn has therefore added a minimum of additional
relevant facts about Mrs. Grundbergfs psychological history and
her use of Halcion and other medications so that the Court will be
able to put the certified questions in a factual and medical
context. Relevant pages of the depositions and other documents
supporting these facts are contained in the Appendix filed herewith.
The Appendix also includes copies of excerpts of certain expert
depositions as well as excerpts of medical articles and books, FDA
and Congressional transcripts and reports, and other published
materials cited in this brief but not readily available.
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Documents, Exhibit B).

In May 1988, Mrs. Grundberg was seen at an

emergency

laboratory

room

where

values

demonstrated

elevated

parathyroid hormone levels and calcium levels indicative of a
condition known as hyperparathyroidism, which can mimic psychiatric
conditions, including aggression.

(Depo. of Steven Van Norman, at

19-20; Depo. of Richard Shanteau, at 123-24).
In 1987, Mrs. Grundberg was told that her mother was
suffering from Alzheimer^ disease (Depo. of Dr. Albert Caccavale,
at 169-70). In March, 1988, Mrs. Grundberg attempted unsuccessfully
to obtain financing to place her mother into a nursing home.
(Master Non-Med. Records, med. 003, 004, 006, 010). On repeated
and varied occasions in May and June 1988, Mrs. Coats expressed
her desire not to be a burden (Master Non-Med. Records, pgm 02728); that she was ready to die (Master Med. Records, ush 148, 160);
and that she wanted to be with her deceased husband (Master Med.
Records, sha 376-79, 379-A, 380, 381, 383).

On June 19, 1989 Mrs. Grundberg took three medications:
Valium, an opiate (codeine), and Halcion (Grundberg Depo. at 523,
537). That night, within one half hour of her mother's 83rd birthday, Mrs. Grundberg shot at her mother five times, reloaded and
shot at her four additional times. A recorded statement was taken
of Mrs. Grundberg after the killing as to the reasons she killed
her mother (Depo. of Lynn Excell at 17). Mrs. Grundberg was then
arrested and was again interviewed the next morning.

(Master Set

of Non-Med. Records, pgm 0001-033). While in jail, Mrs. Grundberg
continued to take Halcion (Ifl. at wsc 0006). In the criminal action
that ensued, court-appointed "alienists" opined that Mrs. Grundberg
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knew what she was doing and intended to kill her mother and that
she had the requisite state of mind to be found guilty of manslaughter (Master Set of Med. Records, how 002-003; gro 013-014).
Nonetheless, the Washington County Prosecutor dropped all criminal
charges and within six weeks, plaintiffs filed this civil action.
2.

FDA Approval of Halcion

Halcion is the trade name for triazolam, a prescription
medication indicated for the short term management of insomnia.
It is one of a particular class of sedating drugs called benzodiazepines.

Benzodiazepines represent a significant advance in safety

and efficacy over the older sleeping medications, such as the barbiturates. James Cooper, Sedative Hypnotic Drugs: Risks and Benefits, National Institute Drug Abuse, pp. 104-05 (1977).
Halcion was the subject of an extensive program of clinical testing beginning with the filing of an Investigational New
Drug Exemption (IND) for Halcion with the United States Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in September 1970.
Sept. 10, 1970.)

(See Letter Dated

On May 4, 1976, Upjohn submitted a New Drug Ap-

plication (NDA) with the FDA, seeking approval to market Halcion
in the United States.

(See Letter Dated May 4, 1976.)

Over a more than six-year period the FDA conducted a
review of both the clinical testing of Halcion and post-marketing
experience in European countries where it already had been approved
since as early as 1977 (Depo. of Otto Kruezer at 189). As those
studies demonstrated, Halcion has a relatively short half-life,
that is, it is rapidly eliminated from the system.

This means

that it does not typically cause side effects such as next day
i
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sedation, which is often seen with longer half-life sleeping pills.
(1977 FDA Advisory Committee Tr. at 311-12).

This is particularly

important for people with trouble sleeping for whom daytime alertness is necessary for job performance or driving safety.
In November 1982, the FDA concluded that Halcion is safe
and effective when prescribed and used according to the product
labeling and approved its marketing in the United States under its
then current product labeling, including warnings and instructions
for the prescribing physician.
1982.)

(See FDA Letter Dated Nov. 15,

Halcion has since become the most widely prescribed

benzodiazepine sleeping medication in the world.

It has now been

approved by regulatory agencies in nearly 80 countries.
Otto Kruezer at 218)

(Depo. of

Halcion, including its current warnings and

instructions for use directed to the prescribing physician, is
still fully approved by the FDA in doses up to 0.5 mg.; it has
never been recalled or its approval revoked by the FDA.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Judge Greene has asked this Court to determine whether
Utah will adopt the nearly universally recognized exception to
strict liability for "unavoidably unsafe products11 set forth in
Comment k to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, and whether the
Court

will

medications.

apply

Comment k

to

all

FDA-approved

prescription

If this Court determines that prescription drugs are

entitled to an exemption from the application of strict liability
in tort, Judge Greene has asked three subguestions concerning the
application of that theory.
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Judge Greene notes that many courts hold that the policy
behind the "unavoidably unsafe product" exception requires that
the exception apply to all prescription drugs. These courts recognize that imposition of strict liability for design defect on prescription drugs would result in overdeterrence by hindering the
development of new and socially useful drugs. They hold that public
policy is best met by judging whether the prescription manufacturer
adequately warned of the drug's risks.
Certain other courts, Judge Greene notes, apply the
unavoidably unsafe product exception to prescription drugs on a
case-by-case basis.

These courts reexamine in a "mini-trial" in

every lawsuit whether the risks of a particular prescription medication were unavoidable at the time of distribution and whether
its benefits appeared to exceed its risks at that time.

If not,

the judge or jury will be allowed to determine in any particular
case that the drug was defectively designed and should not have been
marketed.

Subquestion A asks which approach Utah will follow.
Upjohn submits that this Court should adopt Comment k

and apply it to all FDA-approved prescription drugs. The case-bycase alternative is fraught with dangers and contravenes serious
public policy goals. It would improperly - and unwisely - require
a lay trier of fact to second-guess the United States Food and
Drug Administration's decision that a particular drug should be
available for physicians' use in treating patients. An individual
suit is not an appropriate forum for such a social policy decision;
it is simply not a lay factfinder's role to determine the desirability of making a drug available to the public-at-large.
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Application of Comment k to all FDA-approved prescription
drugs will properly limit the issues in this civil suit to whether
plaintiff is entitled to recover because defendant negligently
failed to warn her physician about the risks of use of the
prescription drug Halcion.

The answer to Subquestion A should

thus be that under Utah law FDA-approved drugs will "be deemed as
a matter

of

law to have

satisfied

the

'unavoidably unsafe1

prerequisite to the Comment k exception."
This Court need not reach Judge Greene's Subguestions B
and C, as the former concerns whether the judge or the jury should
determine the applicability of Comment k on a case-by-case basis,
while the latter concerns the scope of the evidence the chosen
decision maker will consider.

These questions are irrelevant if

this Court applies Comment k to all prescription drugs.
In the event this Court were to adopt a case-by-case
approach, however, Upjohn submits that the applicability of Comment
k must necessarily be determined by the court rather than by the
jury.

The issue is one of policy - whether the FDA properly made

a particular prescription drug available for physicians to use in
treating persons such as plaintiff. The FDA made that determination
in the first instance in reviewing hundreds of volumes of data and
hundreds of clinical studies involving thousands of patients, in
deciding to approve the New Drug Application (NDA) to market Halcion
in 1982 and in continuing to permit Halcion to be available as a
useful and desirable part of the physician's arsenal.
Moreover, the FDA issues its approval of an NDA knowing
that the drug will be available only through the prescription of a

- 9 -
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learned intermediary —

the physician.

Any concerns the FDA has

about use of the product in particular types of patients or situations are allayed by placing FDA-approved prescribing information
in the drug's package insert.

These inserts inform the physician

how and when he may prescribe the medication.

He uses this infor-

mation, his general medical knowledge, and his familiarity with
the patient, in deciding what medications, if any, to use in
treating a particular patient.

This reliance on the physician as

the learned intermediary distinguishes prescription medications from
other products, which are designed with the knowledge that it will
be the consumer who must read and follow the warnings.
If yet a third level of review is to be required, it
should be review by a court, and even a court is ill-equipped to
decide the Comment k issue, for it will not be decided based on
the type of evidence a court usually considers.

To allow trial

courts to determine whether a product is unavoidably unsafe would,
in effect, usurp the function of the Food and Drug Administration
and allow trial courts to make a decision about the societal value
of Halcion, rather than its value to plaintiff. The court would be
functioning as a quasi-regulatory body.

As Utah courts have

repeatedly recognized, regulatory authority is best exercised by
the appropriate regulatory agency, not by the courts.
In any event, such policy decisions should certainly not
be made by a jury. The jury would have to compare Halcion to other
available prescription medications, without having available to it
most of the data about other drugs and their relative risks and
benefits.

Moreover, a jury simply is not likely to understand

- 10 -

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

many of the scientific issues involved, and would be overwhelmed
by the vast amount of evidence about Halcion to be reviewed.
The

jury

in

the

underlying

action

would

also

be

unavoidably and irreparably prejudiced by consideration of volumes
of data relevant only to the Comment k question.

Much of this

evidence would be unduly prejudicial such that it should not be
heard by the jury in the underlying action.

Moreover, the mere

attempt to separate out admissible from inadmissible evidence would
itself be a nightmare, for either court or jury.

The issue is

properly one for the FDA to determine as a policy matter.

Comment

k should apply to all prescription drugs.

I.

THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT COMMENT KfS "UNAVOIDABLY
UNSAFE PRODUCT" EXCEPTION TO STRICT LIABILITY
Considerations of public policy have led every state to

consider the issue to adopt the "unavoidably unsafe product" exception to strict liability either by expressly adopting Comment k
or by adopting a similar common law rule. As Judge Greene noted in
Patten v. Lederle Labs., 676 F. Supp. 233 (D. Utah 1987), even
those cases on which plaintiffs rely recognize and apply Comment k
to products they find to be unavoidably unsafe.2
The uniform adoption of the "unavoidably unsafe product"
exception to strict liability is due to the universality of the
public policy principles it embodies:

manufacturers of products

which are properly prepared and marketed with adequate warnings of
2.
See cases cited in Patten. 676 F. Supp. at 235 n.5. This
makes sense, for before deciding to apply Comment k on a case-bycase basis, a court must first adopt it. See also, cases cited
infra, n. 39 applying Comment k to all prescription drugs.
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knowable dangers should not be held liable for having marketed a
defectively designed product simply because the product necessarily
and unavoidably poses some risks of harm. The text of Comment k is
set forth in the Determinative Rules Section, supra at 1-2.
Courts also universally recognize that the "unavoidably
unsafe product11 exception has special application to prescription
drugs, as they necessarily - unavoidably - entail some risk of
harm; that is why they are only available by prescription in the
first instance.

Thus, Dean Prosser, the Reporter for Restatement

§ 402A, has summed up what is sometimes called the prescription
drug exemption from strict liability as follows:
The argument that industries producing potentially dangerous products should make good the harm, distribute it
by liability insurance, and add the cost to the price
of the product, encounters reason for pause when we consider that two of the greatest medical boons to the human
race, penicillin and cortisone, both have their dangerous
side effects, and that drug companies might well have
been deterred from providing and selling them.
Prosser, Torts § 99, at 161 (4th ed. 1971).3

Dr. Kales, one of

plaintiffs1 experts, has specifically stated that medication should
be one component of the treatment of insomnia.

He cites surveys

3.
Of course, where Comment k applies, plaintiffs may still
proceed on a failure to warn theory under Comment j to § 402A.
Comment j defines what constitutes an "adequate warning":
[T]he seller is required to give warning against
[dangerous ingredients] if he has knowledge, or by
application of reasonable, developed human skill
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of
ingredient and the danger.

it,
the
and
the

§ 402A Comment j. Read together, these comments provide that a
manufacturer is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a
prescription drug so long as the drug was properly prepared and
accompanied by warnings of its risks that were either known or
reasonably scientifically knowable at the time of ingestion.
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showing 13% of the population often have trouble sleeping, and
states chronic insomnia can be characterized as a major disability
and as a prevalent symptom of medical and psychiatric disorders.
"When longstanding and severe, this symptom profoundly affects
patients1 lives and becomes the central focus of distress."4
Utah has adopted § 402A, Hahn. Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.,
601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979), has applied other comments to § 402A
when called upon to do so, and routinely follows comments to other
Restatement sections. None of the cases plaintiffs cite dispute the
validity of Comment k itself or of the principles it embodies.
In fact, Utah and other states have adopted the "learned intermediary doctrine."

That doctrine requires that warnings of risks

of use of a prescription drug be provided to the physician, who
will act as a learned intermediary in determining whether to prescribe that particular drug for a particular patient.
E.R. Squibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984).

Barson v.
In light

of this established law, plaintiffs withdrew their claim that Upjohn
had a duty to warn plaintiffs directly.

See Addendum at 9, n.4.

For these reasons, and because of the policy reasons
behind Comment k, and the universal adoption of that comment by
the courts, Judge Greene has predicted that Utah would adopt Comment
k also.

See Patten. 676 F.2d at 235 & nn. 3, 4. Upjohn requests

this Court to adopt Comment k and its underlying policy rationales.

4.
Kales, et al., "Biopsychobehavioral Correlates of Insomnia,"
Am. J. Psych. 141:1371 (1984). £££ sl£2 Kales, et al., "Insomnia,
The Scope of the Problem," Eval. & Treatment of Insomnia at 37-38,
48 (1984); Kales, et al., "Treatment of Sleep Disorders," 4
Psychiatric Disorders at 210.
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Upjohn further suggests, as discussed below, that under these policies Comment k should apply to all prescription drugs.
II.

THE COMMENT K EXCEPTION FOR "UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE
PRODUCTS" SHOULD BE APPLIED TO ALL PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS FOR VITAL REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY
The key issue for the Court's decision is really a narrow

one.

Plaintiffs argue - and certain cases suggest - that Com-

ment kfs principles can be effectuated in the instance of prescription drugs if the application of Comment Jc to that drug is redetermined in each lawsuit.

For instance, plaintiffs would prefer that

every time a plaintiff sues Upjohn alleging Halcion is defective,
plaintiff1s case would not be limited to proving that Upjohn1s
conduct in marketing Halcion as to that particular plaintiff was
wrongful.

Rather, plaintiff would also request the Court to

redetermine the general social policy issue of whether Halcion
should in general be found to be unavoidably unsafe and so to
"qualify" for Comment k.

According to the cases plaintiffs cited

below, this would require a redetermination in each case of whether
alternatives to Halcion exist which are "better11 for patients in
general, whether the risks of Halcion in general exceed its
benefits, and perhaps even whether "society" needs Halcion.

See.

e.g.. Kearl v. Lederle Labs, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr.
453 (1985).
If Halcion passes these tests in a particular case, then
strict liability for design defect will not be tried or submitted
in that case.

However, the next plaintiff, and the next, and the

next, can again reexamine the basic decision of the FDA to make the
prescription medication Halcion available, with adequate warnings,
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for use by physicians by finding that Halcion is defectively
designed and thus should not have been marketed.
Upjohn submits that a case-by-case redetermination of
the risk-benefit issue not only is inconsistent with the goals
which underlie Comment k, but indeed will undermine those goals.
Moreover, it is simply bad public policy.
are simple:

The reasons for this

Prescription medications are unlike other products in

at least two basic, and vital, respects. First, prescription medications cannot be made completely safe; they will always pose some
risks of side effects.

Despite these risks, and in contrast to

any other product, society has determined that prescription medications provide a unique benefit to society and should be available
to physicians with appropriate warnings.

An elaborate regulatory

system, overseen by the FDA, thus has been set up to control the
approval and distribution of these drugs, and they are made available only through learned intermediaries.
et seq.

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301

No other product receives such special restrictions or

protections in our society.

An individual plaintiff should not be

permitted to upset the delicate balance thus maintained.
Second, the context of an individual lawsuit does not
provide an adequate or appropriate forum for reexamination of the
adequacy of a prescription drug's design, for that design must be
examined in light of the public policy concerns and competing policy
needs discussed above, not in light of the needs of an individual
plaintiff.

Yet, a lawsuit is designed to determine the rights of

an individual plaintiff, not the social desirability of a particular
drug therapy.

The latter is a regulatory matter, and should be
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left to regulators, not courts.

To require a reexamination of

this issue on a case-by-case basis will discourage development of
new drugs, contrary to important public policies of our society.
A.

All Prescription Drugs Entail Some Risk Yet Society
Encourages Their Development
By their nature, all prescription drugs entail risks,

so that no scientist, physician, researcher, regulatory body, jury,
court or pharmaceutical company can ever say with absolute assurance
that a prescription drug will never produce harmful effects in any
people who use it.5
"drug —

Indeed, the FDA has recognized that every

even aspirin —

presents some risks.

If •safety1 were

defined to mean absence of any risk, then no drug could be
approved.11

Dept. of HEW, Section-By-Section Analysis, Drug Regul.

Reform Act of 1978 (1978).

Congress, too, is well aware "all drugs

have serious potential side effects and all drugs are capable of
serious harm if misused or abused.

Therefore, safety is relative

and both patients and regulators must assume some risk."6

5.
See, e.g., Gaston v. Hunter. 588 P.2d 326, 341-342 (Ariz.
App. 1978) ; Urquhart & Heilmann, Risk Watch. The Odds Of Life,
117-119 Facts on File Publications 1984; Goodman & Gilman, The
Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics. 24, 25, 30 (4th ed. 1970);
Wardell, Therapeutic Implications of the Drug Lag. 15 Clin. Pharm.
& Therapeutics, 90, 91 (1974) (toxicity and efficacy testing can
never guarantee a drug's safety in population at large); Comment,
Can a Prescription Drug be Defectively Designed? — Brochu v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 31 DePaul L. Rev. 247, 250-251 & n.13 (1981)
(even the most stringent testing procedures cannot eliminate dangers
in otherwise useful drugs); Gilman & Goodman, The Pharmacological
Basis Of Therapeutics 77 (8th ed. 1990) (,fany drug . . . has the
potential to do harm11).
6.
Subcomm on Sci, Research & Tech of the House Comm on Sci &
Tech, The Food & Drug AdjnjiugtraUon's process For Apprpvjnq New
Drugs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess 51 (Comm Print 1980).
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Although there can thus be no guarantee that any prescription drug will not cause unforeseeable or unanticipated reactions,
new pharmaceuticals are continually approved by the FDA because of
their social benefit in saving lives and alleviating human suffering. As Richard Schweiker, former chief of the Department of Health
& Human Services, succinctly points out:
Imagine what our health care system would be like
if we did not have antibiotics or any number of other
drug products that enable us to quickly recover from
diseases that once were debilitating or even fatal.7
Moreover, particularly since the expansion of tort law is
justified primarily on the basis of deterring or transferring the
cost of injuries, it is appropriate to also consider the increased
costs which would result if production of prescription drugs were
deterred:
In considering a research agenda for evaluating
public policy toward pharmaceuticals, one fact should be
kept stage center, drugs are our most cost-effective
input in supplying the demand for health. A ten-dollar
prescription is frequently a substitute for $2,000 worth
of hospital services — a substitute that produces a
positive outcome with much higher frequency than hospital
care . . . . Our progress in the past in producing drug
substitutes for [medical] procedures • . • indicate[s]
that pharmaceutical innovations could contain the cost
explosion in the health industry.
If we are serious
about minimizing costs, our best bet is to increase the
number of drug innovations. [Emphasis added]
Brozen, Statements, Drugs & Health 305 (Helms ed. 1981)•
7.
37 Food, Drug & Cosmetic L. J. 15 (1982).
In fact/
pharmaceuticals are "among the most vital causes for this century's
dramatic increase in the length and quality of life." Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Cong. Rec. S
10504 (Aug. 10, 1984) (remarks of Senator Hatch).
Accord,
Schwartzman, The Expected Return from Pharmaceutical Research:
Sources of New Drugs and the Profitability of R & D Investment, 17 (1975); Comment, Products Liability: The Continued Viability of
the Learned Intermediary Rule as It Applies to Product Warnings for
Prescription Drugs. 20 U. Rich. L. Rev. 405, 408 (1986).
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At every stage of the drug research and development process, a balance therefore must be struck between unavoidable risks
and health-care benefits.

That balance is struck in the first

instance by the manufacturer.

The balance is subject to careful

scrutiny and c[£ novo determination by the FDA, and is then individualized for each patient by the prescribing physician.

Private

investment decisions totalling billions of dollars annually and
directly affecting the quality and cost of health care in this
nation rest on how this balance is struck.

Ultimately:

The FDA*s approval certifies that an unbiased expert
regulatory body has concluded that these risks are outweighed by the drug's therapeutic benefit and, thus,
represents society's judgment that a particular drug
should be marketed.
Kuhlig & Kingham, Effect of Standardless Punitive Damage Awards.
45 Food, Drug, Cosmetic L. J. 693, 696 (Nov. 1990)
The Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association
recently

reported

concern that the liberalization

of product

liability rules is already Hhaving a profound negative impact on
the development of new medical technologies.ft8
Basic biomedical research is deteriorating in certain
fields because product liability inhibits utilizing that
research to develop new medical products. Small companies
involved in innovative research, such as many of the
biotechnology firms, are delaying or foregoing certain
product releases because of inability to obtain adequate
insurance coverage.
Id.

An FDA Expert Advisory Panel,9 the American Academy of Pedia-

8.
A.M.A., Rot of Bd. of Trustees on Impact of Product Liability
on the Devel. of New Medical Technologies 12 (1988).
9.
FDA, Biological Products; Bacterial Vaccines and Toxoids?
Implementation of Efficacy Review. 50 Fed. Reg. 51,002, 51,006
(1985) ("attempts to improve vaccines further will be hampered"
(continued...)
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tries,10 the Institute of Medicine,11 and commentators12 agree that
liability concerns continue to impede pharmaceutical research and
development.

They have also forced removal of many useful and

desirable products from the market.

See infra. IIIB.

This alarming disincentive for research would only be
exacerbated by a decision of this Court to follow a case-by-case
approach to Comment k.

New drugs are developed almost exclusively

by research intensive companies engaged in the discovery and development of pharmaceuticals. This substantial private research effort
is the source of virtually all new drugs in the United States.
The cost of bringing a single new drug to market has been estimated
at up to $85 million.13

In addition, pharmaceutical firms bear

significant business risks during the development process.
one of

every

10,000

tested

Only

chemical compounds ultimately is

9.(...continued)
by tort liability) (report of the Advisory Panel on Review of
Bacterial Vaccines and Toxoids).
10.
Vaccine Injury Compensation; Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1986) (Statement of Martin
Smith, President, American Academy of Pediatricians) ("research
efforts for new and improved vaccines have been chilled" because
of liability concerns).
11. Inst, of Medicine, Vaccine Supply and Innovation 11 (1984)
("apprehensions are a disincentive to investment in the development
of new (or improved) immunizing agents9*).
12.

P. Huber, Liability; The Legal Revol. and Its Conseq. (1988).

13. See Cohn, The Beginnings: Laboratory and Animal Studies. New
Drug Development 9; Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1984).
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approved.14

If that approval is itself to be second-guessed, little

incentive for development of new drugs remains.
B.

As A Prescription Drug Cannot Be Redesigned, A
Decision That It Is Defectively Designed Is A
Decision That It Should Not Be Marketed
The second basic difference between prescription drugs

and other products is that a prescription drug's "design" cannot
be analyzed in light of the risks and the benefits it offers a
particular plaintiff.

Rather, for the policy reasons discussed

above, these risks and benefits must be analyzed in light of the
drug's value to society as a whole.

This contrasts with a suit

involving other products, such as an industrial machine.

In the

latter case, the factfinder will consider whether the manufacturer
could have moved a pinch point, added a safety guard or otherwise
redesigned the product to avoid a particular injury.

By contrast,

prescription drugs such as Halcion are not truly "designed" at
all, and thus cannot be "redesigned" to add safety.
A prescription drugfs active ingredients produce their
beneficial effect because of their chemical configuration, which
is a scientific constant.
an entirely different drug.

It cannot be changed without creating
The new drug may have similar, but

varying benefits, but it will also have new risks (which again
cannot be altered without creating yet a third product) and it
would have to undergo a completely separate process of FDA approval.
Thus, if a court were allowed to find that Halcion were
defectively designed, it would be saying that Halcion, qua Halcion,
14. See Innovation and Patent Law Reform:; Hrinas Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties. and the Admin, of Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary. 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1206 (1984).

- 20 -
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should not have been marketed - instead, some other similar drug,
or perhaps no drug at all, should have been produced.

The court

could not just make this decision based on the alleged injury to
plaintiff, however, for physician's use prescription drugs in treating a variety of patients in a wide variety of clinical settings.
A drug could be useless, or harmful, for one patient and yet essential for the proper care and treatment of another.
1.

The Social Utility Of Prescription Drugs Should Be
Determined By The Appropriate Regulatory Agencies,
Not By Individual Courts And Juries
Upjohn submits that a determination of the desirability

of making a particular medical product available to physicians is
simply not within either the purposes to be served in the trial of
an individual case, nor is it realistic to expect a judge or jury
to even have the fair ability to make such a determination. Whether
certain prescription drugs should be available in the United States
is a regulatory issue, for the legislature and the executive branch
(through the FDA) to determine as a matter of societal policy. It
is not a matter for the courts except insofar as they review whether
appropriate administrative procedures were followed.
Utah courts have repeatedly recognized that "due to the
important concept of separation of powers in our government, the
courts should defer to the prerogative of the legislature to make
the laws, and confine their own actions to interpreting and applying
them."

Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012,

rev'd on other grounds. 421 U.S. 7 (1974).

This is because:

Inherent in the tripartite allocation of governmental powers is the historical and pragmatic conviction
that particular disputes are most amenable to resolution
in particular forums. The requirement that a plaintiff

- 21
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have a personal stake in the outcome of a dispute is
intended . . . to limit the jurisdiction of the courts
to those disputes which are most efficiently and effectively resolved through the judicial process.
Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983).

In this regard,

"courts are most competent in the exercise of their function when
they have a •concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.1w

Id.

In determining whether the FDA properly approved a prescription drug, a court must go outside a concrete factual context
and make a decision on matters of social policy - whether a drug
should be in the physician's arsenal with which to fight illness.
Utah recognizes that social policy decisions such as this should
not be made by a court, however, but rather in Ma forum where free
wheeling debate on broad issues of public policy is in order.91
Id. at 1150. Accord, Stanton. 517 P.2d at 1013 (policy issues are
best decided by the legislature as it engages in public scrutiny
and debate whereas courts decide issues based on "a controversy
between private individuals").
For these very reasons, in reviewing administrative agency
decisions, this Court has accorded great deference to decisions
based on factfinding or on mixed questions of law and fact, Williams
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tele. Co.. 763 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah
1988) • It has also been recognized by Utah courts that:
Deference, always due by appellate courts to factfinders, is maximized where, as here, the Legislature
has comprehensively delegated responsibility over a particular subject to a specieqUgfl administrative agency-

(
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Wllburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582, 586 (Utah App. 1988)

(emphasis added) • Even on less complicated issues such as can be
involved in workmen's compensation claims, it has been recognized:
that the Commission should be accorded considerable latitude in making determinations . . . [because] [i]n working
with many such
claims the Commission no doubt has developed a 'feel1 for such cases that escapes a court that
deals with them only occasionally.
Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 776 P.2d 639# 643 (Utah
App. 1989) • Certainly in the case of complex issues comprehensively
delegated to a specialized agency, Utah courts would display great
deference to the agency's "feel* for such matters.
In this case, a recognized, specialized and well-respected
public agency exists which has been comprehensively delegated authority over prescription drugs and which is uniquely qualified to
develop a "feel" for whether, as a policy matter, a prescription
medication - such as Halcion - should be available to physicians.
That body is the FDA.

If jurisdictional considerations permitted

appeal to this Court of the FDA's approval of Halcionvs marketing,
this Court's cases would require it to defer to the FDA if it followed proper administrative procedures in reaching its decision.
It is absurd to suggest, as plaintiffs do, that individual trial
courts or juries should nonetheless be permitted to engage in de
novo reviews of the relevant evidence and second (and third and
fourth) guess the FDA's policy decision to make Halcion available.
2.

The FDA Is Given The Authority To Regulate The
Approval For Marketing Of Prescription Drugs
Congress created the FDA as a means "designed primarily

to protect consumers from dangerous products,"

United States v.
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Sullivan. 332 U.S. 689, 696 (1948), by providing uniform federal
regulation of prescription drugs. Congress thus established a:
system of premarket approval for new drugs to ensure
they are safe and effective. Under this system, the
FDA, with the advice of outside medical authorities,
regulates the premarket testing of new drugs, the approval
process, drug manufacturing, labeling and advertising,
and post-approval reporting of adverse events.
Kuhlig & Kingham, 45 Food, Drug & Cosmetic L. J. at 694; 21 U.S.C.
§§ 351-55; 21 C.F.R. parts 200-299, 312, 314.

As stated by the

Acting Commissioner of Food & Drugs of the FDA, the FDA has "evolved
from an embryonic agency originally responsible for ensuring the
safety of relatively few foods and drugs to an organization that
regulates products worth $750 billion, or one-quarter of our
nation's consumer expenditures." Benson, State of the Food and Drug
Admin., 45 Food, Drug Cosmetic L. J. 301, 304 (1990).
Congress has expressly vested the FDA with primary jurisdiction to determine whether a drug can be marketed and how much
research is necessary before such marketing is approved. 21 C.F.R.
§ 10.25(b).

Accordf Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning.

Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 627 (1973) (Congress granted the FDA primary
jurisdiction because the FDA is its "expert agency," with expertise
in resolving technical and scientific questions).

To carry out

these responsibilities, the FDA can be seen to wear many hats that of a regulatory agency; a law enforcement agency; a consumer
protection agency, and a "science-based organization charged to
protect

and

promote

the

public

health."

Benson

at

304.

Commissioner Benson states, that the FDA's principal job, however:
is not simply to regulate products, but to minimize the
medical risks and maximize the benefits associated with
these products. This allows us to analyze each product-
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based problem in public health terms and to build solutions based on regulatory or nonregulatory actions, or
an optimum mix of the two.
Id. at 304.
Indeed, the "FDA is unique in that its sole responsibility
is to determine whether the benefits to be gained by releasing a
new

technology

1 OfReilly,
("O'Reilly11).

The

outweigh
Food

&

the

risks

Drug

Admin.

inherent

in

innovation."

§ 3.07

at

3-22

(1984)

In approving an NDA, the FDA balances the "expected

therapeutic gains" against the "risks entailed by its use." United
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979). Its experts analyze
all the testing, clinical, and anecdotal data and make the "tough
choices about which risks are acceptable in order to obtain a drugfs
benefits."15

The approval process applies "the highest standards

for effectiveness and safety in the world."16
15. O'Reilly, at §§ 14.04-14.05. §es. 21 U.S.C § 505(d); American
Pharm. Assoc, v. Weinberger. 377 F. Supp. 824, 828-831 (D.D.C
1974), aff'd, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (FDA makes initial
decision on drug safety and effectiveness based on all available
medical and scientific data).
16. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the Subcommittee on the
Judiciary. 93rd Cong. 2d Sess., 616-18 (1974). "The average new
drug application today contains 100,000 pages, filling hundreds of
volumes. Applications arrive at FDA, literally, in truck loads."
O'Reilly. § 13.11 at 13-57 n.6 (quoting former HHS Secretary
Schweiker). The new drug approval process can require as much as
ten years of testing and evaluation that includes: (1) preliminary
evaluation of a pharmaceuticals chemical and therapeutic
properties; (2) testing in animal models; (3) detailed protocols
for testing in humans; (4) double-blind, placebo-controlled testing
on several hundred persons and, if these tests provide assurances
of the drugfs safety and effectiveness; (5) at least two long-term
clinical trials involving large groups of patients to further assess
safety, effectiveness and optimal dosage. See 47 Fed. Reg. 46622,
et seg. (Oct. 19, 1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 26720, et sea. (June 9, 1983);
21 U.S.C. § 301 efe seg. ? Schwartz, "Medical Costs and the Drug
Industry11 Wall St. J. 26. (Apr. 21, 1980).
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The FDA's risk-benefit evaluation does not stop with
FDA approval of a drug for marketing.

Detailed warnings of known

risks and statements of efficacy are formulated by the FDA and
required to be supplied to the prescribing physician in a carefully
tailored "package insert.11 The FDA then continues to monitor drugs
through an elaborate worldwide surveillance system that draws upon
safety reports from clinical studies, epidemiological studies, and
data published in medical literature.17

If the manufacturer with-

holds relevant information, tort liability can follow.18
The FDA is well-situated to carry out its regulatory
role, having over 8,000 employees.
Jr., M.D., Vol. I, at 139.

Depo. of Arthur Hull Hayes,

Dr. Hayes was Commissioner of the FDA

in 1982, the year the New Drug Application (,fNDAM) for Halcion
was approved and is a witness in this case.

Dr. Hayes testified

that the FDA New Drug Review staff during the year prior to approval
of Halcion consisted of approximately 77 physicians, 50 chemists,
36 pharmacologists, and 40 Consumer Safety Officers.

Id. at 342.

Moreover, seven congressional subcommittees have "jurisdiction for
conducting oversight of the FDA • • • including the labor committee
in the Senate, including the House energy and commerce committee[s],
both the committee on health and environment and oversight for the
17. Postmarketing Surveillance of Prescription Drugs, Office of
Technology Assessment, U.S. Cong., U.S. 6.P.O. (Nov. 1982); Lee &
Turner, Food and Drug Administration's Adverse Drug Reaction
Monitoring Program, 35 Am. J. Hosp. Pharm. 929 (1978) ; see, 21
C.F.R. §314.1 (1984); 21 C.F.R. 310.300(a) (1984); 21 C.F.R.
§§ 310.300(b), (b)(2) (1983).
18. Collins v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.. 186 Cal. App. 3d 1194, 231
Cal. Rptr. 396, 404 (1986); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell. Inc..
251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 702-05 (1967).
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investigation committee."
I, at 1-143, 1-144.

Depo. of Edward 0. Bixler, Ph.D., Vol.

The small business and government operations

committees also engage in oversight.

Id.

The federal cases hold that, by allowing a drug to be
marketed, the FDA has "determined that a legitimate public interest
in its availability outweighs any adversities which might arise in
the course of its usage.

TA1 court is not in a position to second-

guess such a determination."19
Neither should individual courts and juries in products
liability cases play a role in determining whether a prescription
drug should have been marketed.

That decision is up to the FDA.

An individual suit should be limited to whether the drug was properly labeled so that the physician could adequately evaluate its
use in treatment of plaintiff.

It should not be used to second-

guess the Congress and the FDA's policy decisions. Comment k should
be applied to exempt all properly labeled and manufactured prescription drugs from liability for design defect.
III. THE BETTER REASONED CASES SUPPORT APPLICATION
OF THE UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE PRODUCT EXCEPTION TO
ALL PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
A.

All Jurisdictions Give Special Treatment
To Prescription Drugs

In light of the unique nature of prescription medications,
their extensive regulation by the FDA, and the public policy concern
that research and development of such drugs not be discouraged,
19. Jacobs v. Dista Products Co.. 693 F. Supp. 1029, 1035 (D. Wyo.
1988) (emphasis added). Accord, Hanson v. United States, 417 F.
Supp. 30, 37 (D. Minn. 1976), aff'd. 540 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976)
("The district courts have no role to play in determining whether
a new drug should or should not be approved by the FDA.)11
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courts and legislatures have exercised extreme caution to ensure
that the expansion of product liability theories will not unduly
deter the development and production of pharmaceuticals.
For instance, nearly all courts, including those relied
on by plaintiffs, have adopted Comments k and j to § 402A, and the
negligence standard they embody, as applied to allegations of
failure to warn about the alleged risks of prescription medications.20

"Public policy favors the development and marketing of

new and more efficacious drugs. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
recognizes this policy by rejecting strict liability in favor of
negligence for drug related injuries, . . . n Payton v. Abbott Labs,
386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 189-90 (1982).
Similarly, in Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co.. 79 111. 2d 26,
402 N.E.2d 194, 199-200 (1980), the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
This court is acutely aware of the social desirability of encouraging the research and development of beneficial drugs. We are equally aware that risks, often
grave, may accompany the introduction of these drugs
into the marketplace. We simply think, however, in accordance with Comments j and k of section 4 02A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, that where liability is
framed by the manufacturers duty to warn adequately of
dangers which may arise from the use of a drug, that

20. See, e.g., Gaston v. Hunter. 588 P.2d 326, 341-342 (Ariz. 1978)
(public policy favors new drug development, for there is always
"the risk that needless human suffering and death will occur because
a beneficial new drug is withheld from mankind too long11); Sheffield
v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 597 (1983) (held there
is "a recognized public policy in encouraging swift production and
marketing of new pharmaceutical products which prevent disease and
save human life.)11 See also, Schmidt, The FDA Today: Critics,
Congress and Consumerism, in The Drug Lag; Federal Government
Decisionmaking 35 (R. Campbell ed. 1968); Wardell RX for Drug
Regulation 25-28 (Sept.-Oct. 1979); Note, The Liability of Pharm.
Mfrs. For Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 Fordham L. Rev.
735, 756-757 (when new drugs are delayed "the human cost . . .
falls primarily on the incarcerated, the indigent and the ill").
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liability should be based on there being some manner in
which to know of the danger.
For similar reasons, the vast majority of jurisdictions,
including Utah, have adopted the "learned intermediary doctrine."
As previously noted, even plaintiffs recognize that Utah applies
that doctrine and that the pharmaceutical manufacturer's duty to
warn is limited to warning the physician, not the patient.
In Brown v. Superior Court. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470, 476 (1988), the California Supreme Court
agreed with the rationale of these and similar cases.21

It held

that courts must strongly consider these important distinctions
between prescription drugs and other products intended simply for
pleasure or to make life easier.

They must not lose sight of the

fact that prescription drugs, unlike even other life-bettering
medical products such as wheelchairs, necessarily entail some risks
of perhaps serious harm.

For this reason, "the broader public

interest in the availability of drugs at an affordable price must
be considered in deciding the appropriate standard of liability
for injuries resulting from their use."

751 P.2d at 478-79.

Brown concluded "[i]f drug manufacturers were subject
to strict liability, they might be reluctant to undertake research
programs to develop some pharmaceuticals that would prove beneficial
or to distribute others that are available to be marketed, because
of the fear of large adverse monetary judgments."

Id.

21. Accord, Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 186 Cal. App.
3d at 1203; Kearl v. Lederle Labs.. 172 Cal. App. 3d at 822-25;
Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 144 Cal. App. 3d at 598-99. See,
Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically
Undiscoverable Defects. 71 Geo. L. Rev. 1635, 1648-1650 (1983).
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These same policy concerns have led a multitude of legislatures to adopt special statutory restrictions on liability for
prescription drugs.
practice.

Utah lav provides a prime example of this

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-18-2(1) (Supp. 1990) states that

"punitive damages may not be awarded if a drug causing the claimant's harm:

(a) received premarket approval or licensure by the

Federal Food and Drug Administration . . ••' The Utah legislature
has thus made an important policy decision designed to avoid discouraging marketing of FDA-approved drugs.

This policy applies

even to drugs marketed with inadequate warnings.
Many other states have enacted similar special rules
recognizing the unique place of prescription drugs in our society.
Thus, in addition to Utah, five other states provide a prescription
drug exemption from punitive damages.22 New Jersey further provides
a rebuttable presumption that an FDA-approved warning was adequate,
see N.J. Stat. § 2A: 58C-4, and Maryland precludes even negligence
liability on the part of a physician for proper use of FDA-approved
drugs. Md. Ad. Legis. Serv. Ch. 546, § 18-401 (1990).
The authorities relied on by plaintiffs justify their
expansion of the basis of liability of pharmaceutical manufacturers
by relying on the oft-repeated, but increasingly questionable,.
justification that increasing the scope of a manufacturer's liability will purportedly encourage it to make a safe product.

To the

contrary, there is no evidence that subjecting complex prescription

22. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-701(A); N.J. Stat. § 2A:58C-5(c);
Oh. Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.80(C); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.927; Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 13-64-302.5(5).
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<

drugs to repeated reevaluations by lay judges and juries will
improve the safety of those drugs to any degree.
On the other hand, there are good reasons to conclude
that, in the area of prescription drugs, products liability law has
gone far enough. While a drug manufacturer typically spends up to
$85 million to develop and test a new drug23 and while each new
product undergoes the most stringent regulatory scrutiny in the
world, there still can be no guarantee of absolute safety.
Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics. 59-60 (7th ed. 1985).

The
As

noted by the Tort Policy Working Group:
The changing standards of liability and causation have
generated tremendous uncertainty.
The ,frules of the
game" of tort liability have changed so dramatically and
rapidly in recent years that fewer are willing to speculate on what those rules will be even a few years hence.
Invariably, however, those rules seem to have changed to
the prejudice of parties with pockets sufficiently deep
to bear increasingly generous awards of compensation.24
Increasingly,
whether

manufacturers

the response to this uncertainty
will

be

subject

to

massive,

over

uninsured

liabilities has been removal of important, beneficial products
from the market.

This is not some tired song of manufacturers;25

it is a stark reality. A 1990 Commerce Report industrial Outlook"
23. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act:
Hearing Before the Sen?t? C9T"^> on Labor and Human Resources, 98th
Cong. 2d Sees. 106 (1984).
24. United States Department of Justice, Report of the Tort Policy
Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the
Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability 51 (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, Feb. 1986).
25. While some people have suggested that some insurance companies
have invented the "insurance crisis11 to justify increased rates,
there can be no doubt that those rates have in fact increased
dramatically and have forced many prescription drugs and other
products as veil, off the market.
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survey of U.S. industry concluded that current product liability
policy

creates

competitive

disadvantages

for

the

U.S.

pharmaceutical, vaccine, medical device, chemical and pesticide
industries. Vol. 52, The Pink Sheet. April 9, 1990. A few examples
of the results of this concern are noted below.

These are just

the tip of the iceberg.
B.

ynav^UgbiUtV Pf Vfrccjneg ?nd Qthey Pryqs

DTP Vaccine.

In the 1960's, there were as many as eight

manufacturers of diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis (DTP) vaccine.
In June 1984, Wyeth announced it would cease production of DTP
vaccine, citing "higher insurance costs and the risk of liability
and lawsuits from users of the vaccine, as well as the cost of
defending any lawsuits."

N.Y. Times, June 20, 1984, § D at 4,

col. 6. This left only two manufacturers of the vaccine. Connaught
Laboratories withdrew from the market soon thereafter, also citing

<

sharply higher liability insurance rates. The cost of the vaccine
skyrocketed from 45 cents in 1982 to $11.40 per shot in 1986, and
most of the increases went into a fund for lawsuits.26

<

Spot shortages of DTP vaccine had already been reported
by the Centers for Disease Control.

Federal officials identified

the "increasing number of lawsuits" as the major reason for the
shortage.27

<

In response to the unavailability of the vaccine, the

Centers recommended that physicians postpone DTP booster shots and
1
26. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1984, § C at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
Dec. 12, 1984, § A at 21, col. 1: The Product Liability Reform
Act; Report of Senator Danforth, Committee on Commerce. Science,
and Transportation. 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (Aug. 15, 1986).
27. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1984 § A at 19, col. 1.
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defer giving DTP vaccine to children other than infants in order to
conserve supplies.

Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis Vaccine Shortage,

253 J.A.M.A. 1540 (1985).
The DTP shortage of 1984-1985 was a remarkable event,
and one that must be considered when evaluating expanded theories
advocated by plaintiffs. The worldfs most technologically advanced
nation, with one of the most sophisticated systems of health care
delivery, could not provide its citizens with a vaccine whose utility and effectiveness had been established for 40 years.

In part

to prevent such shortages, Congress stepped in and created the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986.28
Polio Vaccine.

The DTP crisis is only the most recent

in a series of drug shortages directly related to manufacturers1
inability to obtain insurance.

In 1976, the Senate traced the

unavailability of polio vaccine in twelve states to rulings expanding the theories of liability in connection with mass vaccination
programs. The Assistant Surgeon General testified manufacturer:
liability for vaccine-associated disability, regularly
assigned by courts, threatens a predictable vaccine supply
— especially of oral polio vaccine — and diminishes
the chances of significant independent manufacturer-sponsored research and development of new biologies.29

28. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-10, e£ sgg. (1986).
29. Polio Immunization Program, 1976: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (Sept. 23, 1976). The problem was partially
solved when the Public Health Service agreed to assume
responsibility for transmitting an elaborate warning to participants
in immunization programs. However, a report has found that there
remains only one maker of oral polio vaccine. Brody, "When Products
Turn Into Liabilities" Litigation & Ins. 8-11 (Jul/Aug 1986).
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Svine Flu Vaccine. Similarly, when the federal government
began planning a mass program of public immunization against swine
flu, pharmaceutical companies were afraid to produce the required
vaccine because of concerns over potential liability and over the
unavailability of insurance. Had the government not stepped in to
provide immunity under the National Swine Flu Immunization Program
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976), the vaccine
would not have been produced.

The next time, the government may

not be willing or able to afford to provide such immunity.30
Bendectin.

This prescription morning sickness drug was

used in an estimated 33 million pregnancies over 27 years. Despite
40 epidemiological studies showing no increased incidence of birth
defects, a flood of lawsuits was filed against the manufacturer.
In 1983, the manufacturer's insurance premiums reached $10 million
on sales of $12 to $13 million.

In 1984, even after a federal

jury found that Bendectin was not responsible for birth defects,
the company abandoned production of the drug.31
Oculinum.

This experimental medicine was the only medi-

cine that provided satisfactory relief to thousands of patients
with rare neuromuscular disorders which resulted in functional

30. Remarks of Douglas A. Riggs, General Counsel of the U.S.
Department of Commerce on the Causes of the Insurance and Product
Liability Crisis 5 (June 26, 1986); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Rpt. of
the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy
Implications of the Current Crisis in Insur. Availability and
Affordability 76-80 (Washington, D.C., Gov. P.O., Feb. 1986).
31. Tamar Lewin, Pharmaceutical Companies Are the Hardest Hit, N.Y.
Times, March 10, 1985 § 3 at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, March 14, 1985
§ A at 22, col.6.
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blindness.

In 1986# the supply of the medicine was cut off when

its only manufacturer was unable to obtain liability insurance.32
Vaccine for Japanese Encephalitis.

In 1986, the manu-

facturer ceased distribution of this vaccine because it could not
obtain "appropriate liability insurance, and there was no statutory
mechanism for absolving it of liability."33

The vaccinefs unavail-

ability put Americans traveling to Asia at risk.
The loss of beneficial products can occur without actually
driving a particular manufacturer entirely out of business.

It

does not matter whether an important pharmaceutical therapy is
lost because of a ruined producer or because the product was abandoned in favor of research less fraught with liability risks.

In

either case, the negative impact on the public health is the same.
Contraceptive and Fertility Drugs.

The adverse impact

of expanded theories of liability has also been keenly felt by
manufacturers of contraceptive drugs for women.

The AMA has docu-

mented the dramatic drop in basic research:
In the early 1970s, there were 13 pharmaceutical companies
actively pursuing research on contraception and fertility.
Now, only one U.S. company conducts contraceptive and
fertility research. Unless the liability laws are drastically altered, it is unlikely that pharmaceutical companies will aggressively pursue research in this area.34

32.

N.Y. Times, October 14, 1986 § C at 1, col. 3.

33. Marcus, Liability for Vaccine-Related Injuries, 318 N. Eng. J.
Med. 191 (1988).
34. A.M.A., Report of Board of Trustees, supra at 9; see also N.Y.
Times, October 30, 1988, § 1 at 1, col. 1 (In 1970, "there were 20
companies doing research on contraceptive development, including
all family planning methods. Now all but one has gotten out of
the business.").
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Private domestic research expenditures on contraceptives declined
by 90% in the decade following their peak in 1973, and "no truly
new contraceptive chemical entities have been introduced since
1968."35

Innovation also has virtually ceased with respect to

fertility drugs due to liability concerns.36
AIDS Research.

The above examples are proof of the

negative impact of expanded theories of liability on the development
of new drugs.

What lies ahead?

Some forecast that the "general

climate of uncertainty is something that deters many pharmaceutical
companies from being involved in AIDS vaccine research."37 Commerce
Department Secretary Mosbacher labelled such discouragement "a
tragedy for this country," noting "product liability concern caused
Genentech to cancel research into an AIDS vaccine [because] the
potential liability for that product was so great."38
Concern about these and similar examples of the effect
of expansion of product liability rules on pharmaceutical research
and development has been the impetus behind the decisions of Cali35. P. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences
(1988), at 155; see also Chicago Sun-Times, September 23, 1987,
§ 2, at 37 (",Wetre basically going to hell as far as
contraceptives and women's health is concerned.1").
36.

P. Huber, J&j. at 155.

37. Statement of Project Director the National Academy of Science
Report, Confronting AIDS — Directions for Public Health. Health
Care, and Research, 222 (1986), in Insurance Costs Deter AIDS
Vaccine, Liab. & Ins. Bull. (BNA) No. 1, at 5 (November 3, 1986).
38. Vol. 52 The Pink Sheet. April 9, 1990. Others suggest that
this country may soon be in the ludicrous position of developing a
vaccine for AIDS and not being able to find a manufacturer to
produce it because of liability concerns. See Will AIDS Vaccine
Bankrupt the Company that Makes It?. Science 1035 (Sept. 1986);
Benefits. Risks, Vaccines and the Courts. Science (March 1985);
Liability Nightmare. National Review 15 (Aug. 23, 1985).

36
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fornia and other states to reject a case-by-case application of
Comment k.

These courts state that every Mdrug properly tested,

labeled with appropriate warnings, approved by the Food and Drug
Administration, and marketed properly under federal regulation is,
as a matter of law, a reasonably safe product." Leibowitz v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp.. 307 A.2d 449, 458 (Pa. 1973).
C.

The Better Reasoned Decisions Further The Special
Policy In Favor Of Prescription Drugs By Applying
Comment k To All Prescription Drugs
The most important recent case to determine that Com-

ment k's "unavoidably unsafe product" exception should be applied
to all prescription medications is Brown v. Superior Court. 751
P.2d at 480-83.

Brown expressly disapproved the conclusion of

Kearl v. Lederle Labs.. 218 Cal. Rptr. at 464, that Comment k should
be applied on a case-by-case basis.

Kearl had suggested, at 464,

that in each case an evidentiary "mini-trial" should be held out
of the jury's hearing at which the court would decide whether the
drug qualified for Comment k by considering;
(1) whether, when distributed, the product was intended
to confer an exceptionally important benefit that made
its availability highly desirable; (2) whether the thenexisting risk posed by the product was both 'substantial1
and 'unavoidable'; and (3) whether the interest in availability (again measured as of the time of distribution)
outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountability through strict liability design defect review.
Brown found Kearl's case-by-case approach unworkable in
practice and inadvisable as public policy.

Under Kearl. whether

a drug qualified for Comment k treatment would be a mixed question
of fact and law, which each judge faced with a case concerning
that drug would

be

forced to redetermine.

This would mean

"different trial judges might reach different conclusions as to
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whether the same drug should be measured by strict liability
principles . . . [and we] do not see how a reviewing court could
harmonize these differing conclusions • . •"

Brown. 751 P.2d at

482.
Brown further found that the factors used by a judge to
decide whether a drug qualifies for Comment k treatment would overlap considerably with the factors a jury would use to decide design
defect liability if Comment k were not applied, so that "the judge
in effect makes a preliminary determination whether a drug contains
a design defect."
a

PPiy#

and

Id.

If the judge decided Comment k did not

the jury decided that there was no design defect using

similar standards, "there is a danger of inconsistency between
the findings of the judge and the jury in the same case.'9

Id.

Most importantly, Brown found Kearl's approach would
discourage the development of new drugs, and so negate the principal
purpose of applying Comment k in the first instance. Under Kearl.
a "drug manufacturer has no assurance that a product he places on
the market will be measured by the liability standard of comment k
..."

Brown. 751 P.2d at 481.

Because every drug is subject to

scrutiny to see if it "qualifies":
[a] manufacturer's incentive to develop what it might
consider a superior product would be diminished if it
might be held strictly liable for harmful side effects
because a trial court could decide, perhaps many years
later, that in fact another product which was available
on the market would have accomplished the same result.
Id. at 482. Brown thus held the case-by-case determination cannot
"be accomplished without substantially impairing the public interest
in the development and marketing of new drugs, because the harm to

« 38 -
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this interest arises in the very process of attempting to make the
distinction."

Id. at 481 (emphasis added).

These serious policy concerns convinced the California
Supreme Court that "In order to vindicate the public's interest
in the availability and affordability of prescription drugs, a manufacturer must have a greater assurance that his products will not
be measured by a strict liability standard than is provided by the
test stated in Kearl." Brown. 751 P.2d at 482. Therefore:
[I]n accord with almost all of our sister states39 that
have considered the issue, we hold that a manufacturer
is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription drug so long as the drug was properly prepared and
accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities
that were either known or reasonably scientifically knowable at the time of distribution.

39. Among the decisions with which Brown is in accord is Plummer
v. Lederle Labs.. 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir.), cert, denied. 484
U.S. 898 (1987) (citing the Brown intermediate appellate decision)
(if drug manufacturers adequately warn, "they are not held to a
strict liability standard for the consequences attending the use
of the product, but to a negligence standard"); Fellows v. U.S.V.
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 502 F. Supp. 297, 300 (D. Md. 1980) (a
prescription drug manufacturer will not incur liability under § 402A
"unless the manufacturer has failed to provide adequate warnings
of the drug's possible dangers"); Stone v. Smith. Kline & French
Labs. 447 So. 2d 1301, 1304 (Ala. 1984) ("in the case of an
•unavoidably unsafe' yet properly prepared prescription drug, the
adequacy of the accompanying warning determines whether the drug,
as marketed, is defective or unreasonably dangerous"). Accord.
Weinberger v. Bristol-Mvers Co.. 652 F. Supp. 187 (D. Md. 1986) ;
Purvis v. PPG Indus.. Inc.. 502 So. 2d 714, 718 (Ala. 1987); Collins
v. Qrtho Pharm. Corp.. 231 Cal. Rptr. at 400-405; Gaston v. Hunter.
588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. App. 1978); McKee v. Moore. 648 P.2d 21 (Okla.
1982); Kirk v. Michael Reese HOSP. & Med. Ctr. 117 111. 2d 507,
513 N.E.2d 387, 392-94 (111. 1987), cert, denied. 485 U.S. 905
(1988); McElhanev v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 575 F. Supp. 228 (D. S.D.
1983), aff'd. 739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984); Lindsay v. Qrtho Pharm.
Corp.. 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980); Chambers v. G.D. Searle &
£0^, 441 F. Supp. 377, 380-81 (D. Md. 1975); aff'd. 567 F.2d 269
(4th Cir. 1977); Leibowitz v. Qrtho Pharm. Corp.. 224 Pa. Super.
418, 307 A.2d 449, 457-59 (1973) and Qrtho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman.
180 Ind. App. 33, 388 N.E.2d 541, 544-53 (1979) (all stating
prescription drug manufacturers are judged under a negligence standard).
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Brown. 751 P.2d at 482-83.

The California Supreme Court recently

reaffirmed its "fear that strict product liability would frustrate
pharmaceutical research" in Moore v. Regents of The Univ. of Calif..
51 Cal. 3d 120, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 793 P.2d 479 (1990).
D.

The Case-By-Case Approach Contravenes The Policies
Behind Comment k And Does Not Provide Any Coherent
Or Practical Guide For Its Application
Plaintiffs would have the Court ignore the public policy

rationales behind Brown and similar decisions, and authorize reexamination of the marketing of a drug in every case. Upjohn respectfully suggests that this simply makes no sense, for in so doing a
court would effectively be determining that the FDA erred in approving the drug in the first instance.

As the above discussion

teaches, this is clearly not a court or jury's role in a civil
personal injury case such as this one.

Moreover, uniform appli-

cation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 g£ seq.,
would be seriously threatened.

<

H

Judicial interpretation of the

effect of FDA approval by state courts which furthers this policy
of interstate consistency is thus preferable to interpretation

<

which undermines this goal." Collins, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
1.

The Cases Cited By Plaintiff Erroneously
Believed That A Case-By-Case Approach Was
Necessary To Protect The Public

The cases relied on by plaintiffs, which decided a caseby-case analysis could and should be made, are simply wrongly
decided.

Counsel for Upjohn are familiar with the briefing in a

number of these cases,40 and it is unfortunate that neither the
40. These cases include Kociemba v. G.D. Searle S Co., 680 F. Supp.
1293 (D. Minn.), fin reh'r, 695 F. Supp. 432 (D. Minn. 1988); and
Pollard v. Ashby. 793 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. App. 1990), among others.

40 -

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

relevant policy issues, nor the practical effects of adoption of a
case-by-case approach, were adequately raised to those courts.
Whether this is the reason these courts reached their decisions is
of course unknown, but it is instructive that only the Brown briefs
fully discussed these issues. In any event, a review of plaintiffs1
cases reveals that none fully considered the policy reasons against
a case-by-case approach. Each instead focused on the same concern:
that application of Comment k to all prescription drugs might permit
an undeserving drug with "fractious" benefit to somehow get past
the FDA and yet be immune from liability.41
valid one.

This concern is not a

The approach taken by Brown and the other cases cited

leaves the public, and plaintiffs, well protected.
First, as discussed above and as set out in detail in
Tab A of the Appendix in regard to Halcion, the FDA undertakes a
far more extensive and thorough review of a drugfs risks and benefits to society than could ever be undertaken by an individual
court or jury. The FDA can call on teams of scientists, researchers
and physicians in reviewing each NDA; it can hold hearings; it can
demand new tests and studies; it can add warnings or delete indications; it can consult Science Advisory Committees, and it can remove
a drug from the market, either sua sponte or through a petition
which could be filed with it by plaintiff or by any other person.
The public is well protected by existing law.
Furthermore, to the extent that risks are unknown after
the many levels of expert risk-benefit analysis performed by the
41. See, e.g., poUarfl Yt A^toY* 793 S.W.2d at 400; Toner v.
Lederle Laboratories. 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297 (1987), cert.
denied. 485 U.S. 942 (1988), and cases cited infra. pp. 43-45.
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manufacturer, the FDA, the Congress, and the physician, having
juries second-guess these risk-benefit decisions in hindsight will
not enhance public safety. Neither courts nor juries should be able
to disregard the considered decisions of administrative agencies
which have expertise and are charged with responsibility to make
informed decisions about these key social policy matters.
Moreover, application of Comment k simply prohibits design
defect liability for prescription drugs.

It in no way inhibits

imposition of liability for negligently marketed medications without
adequate labeling.

The application of Comment k simply means that

needed medications, the dangers of which cannot be avoided, will
be permitted to remain on the market without imposition of liability, if, but only if. (1) adequate warnings are given in light of
what defendant knew or should have known, and (2) FDA approval is
received based on adequate information.
It must also be remembered that the standard which a
prescription drug manufacturer must meet under Utah law and that of
other jurisdictions to show adequacy of warning under a negligence

(

theory is extremely high. Utah holds that:
In determining whether a manufacturer has breached
that duty [to adequately warn] and the extent to which a
manufacturer is required to know of dangers inherent in
its drug, it is important to point out that the drug
manufacturer is held to be an expert in its particular
field and is under a Continuous duty . . . to keep
abreast of scientific developments touching upon the
manufacturers product and to notify the medical profession of any additional side effects discovered from its
use.1
Tfre flrug manufacturer is responsible therefore
for not only 'actual knowledge gained from research and
adverse reaction reports,1 but also for Constructive
knowledge ?s measured fey ggjentifjg literature and other
available means of communication.
Barson, 682 P.2d at 835-36 (emphasis added).
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2.

The Case-By-Case Approach Is Inconsistently
Applied and Offers No Greater Public Protection
Than Does Application of Comment k to All Prescription Drugs.

Even were the reasons for concern with the application
of Comment k to all prescription drugs valid, the case-by-case
approach does not provide a desirable way to resolve that concern.
As just noted, even if Comment k applies, the manufacturer
is held to the skill of an expert and is liable for any negligence
in warning.

To this plaintiffs wish to add the uncertainty - the

"Russian Roullette" - of the case-by-case approach. As Brown states
so well, however, such uncertainty will discourage the development
of new drugs because the manufacturer will have no way of knowing
by what standard his drug will be judged. Indeed, the manufacturer
cannot even predict what case-by-case test may be applied, further
undermining both its ability to develop a drug which will meet
this test, and its willingness to even attempt to market a new
drug in the face of such an uncertain standard for liability.
For instance, Kearl v. Lederle Labs, 218 Cal. Rptr. at
463, as well as other decisions such as Johnson v. American
Cvanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986), hold that whether
Comment k will apply to a drug is a mixed question of law and fact
for determination by the Court outside the presence of the jury.
On the other hand, Castrianano v. E.R. Souibb & Sons. Inc.. 546
A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988), would leave the issue to the court in
the cases of drugs clearly deserving protection, but would submit
it to the jury in close cases.

Pollard v. Ashby. 793 S.W.2d 394
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(Mo. App. 1990), would seem to follow the converse approach.42
Finally, one or two authorities have suggested that the issue is
one of fact for the jury.
410,

416

Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d

(Colo. 1986); S. Willig, The Comment K Character: A

Conceptual Barrier to Strict Liability. 29 Mercer L. Rev. 545, 579
(1978).
As thoroughly discussed above, Upjohn believes the Com*
ment k decision is a policy one to be made by the legislature and
the FDA, and not by the judiciary.

If the issue is to be decided

in the courts, however, it should be decided by the judge, not by
the jury, for it is a policy issue, to be determined following a
"hearing" as to relevant facts and social policies.

In any event,

the lack of agreement as to who should decide this issue is a strong
indication that the case-by-case approach is not well thought out
or capable of consistent application.

Absent such consistency,

where is the deterrence or other public benefit found?
Even if it were agreed who would decide the Comment k
issue, courts have reached varying determinations as to what test
that reviewer will apply.

Kearl sets forth the test as follows:

(1) the product was intended to provide an exceptionally
important benefit that made its availability highly
desirable, (2) the risk posed by the product was substantial and unavoidable when distributed, and (3) the
interest in availability, measured as of the time of
distribution, outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced
42. Although Pollard officially declined to reach who should
decide the Comment k issue in a case in which defendant failed to
raise Comment k until the jury was instructed, it did state that
in close cases "the trial court should strongly consider the public
interest of increased protection for drug manufacturers."
793
S.W.2d at 400, n.8 (emphasis added). Thus, perhaps unintentionally,
the court indicated its belief that the issue is for the court as
a policy matter at least in close cases.

44
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accountability, the product will be deemed unavoidably
dangerous and exempted from strict products liability
design defect analysis.
218 Cal. Rptr. at 464.

In determining the "unavoidability" of

risk, Kearl states the court will consider whether the product
minimized known risks and whether available alternative products
would have "as effectively accomplished the full intended purpose
of the subject product."
Toper v l*tert$
tors:

Id. (emphasis in original).
Lafrff directly identifies two basic fac-

whether (1) the risk is unavoidable in that the product

could not have then been made more safely and there was then "no
feasible alternative design which on balance accomplishes the subject productfs purpose with a lesser risk," 732 P.2d at 306; and
(2) the drugfs benefits which "clearly appear at the time of distribution to outweigh their concomitant risks."

Id. at 308.

Hill v. Searle Labs. 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989),
determined that "exceptional social need" for the product must
also be shown.

Castrianano v. Abbott Labs, by contrast, simply

states that "the apparent benefits of the drug must exceed the
apparent risks" to preclude design defect liability.
781.

546 A.2d at

Other decisions offer even less guidance as to how to decide

the issue, figg, ?Tqt/ Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co.. 695 F. Supp.
432 (D. Minn. 1988) (equating test with negligence inquiry).
The differences in these approaches may not have seemed
important to the courts adopting them, but they are very important
to drug manufacturers.

Proof that Halcio^s "apparent benefits

exceed its apparent risks" would require extensive evidence supporting Halcionfs efficacy and safety.

45 -
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need", on the other hand, might also require discussion of Halcionfs
role in our society.

Whether Halcion will "qualify" under that

test might vary with changing public opinions toward medicines in
general, and toward benzodiazepines in particular.

It might also

vary depending upon whether one has had a need for the product. A
sleeping aid may seem unimportant to some, but vital to insomniacs;
a pain reliever simply a minor benefit to some, but a life-saver
to persons with migraine headaches.
Equally unclear is how a court could compare Halcion or
any other complex drug with its competitorsf products to determine
if the latter would as effectively accomplish the drug's intended
purpose (as Kearl requires)•

This comparison will often be like

the ill-fated attempt to compare "apples and oranges."

The com-

parison simply cannot be made on any rational or consistent basis.
For instance, in this case no discovery has been had of Up John's
competitors' regarding their benzodiazepine drugs.

<

The jury will

have neither the information contained in its competitors' files
nor in the files of the FDA regarding competitors' drugs. How can

<

a lay factfinder make the kind of comparisons that the FDA has already made when it has none of the critical information necessary?
Furthermore, a lay factfinder is not equipped to make
the same kind of risk-benefit analysis made by the FDA.
is not constrained by rules of evidence.

The FDA

It can form task forces

and Advisory Committees and conduct hearings and on-site inspections.

<

<

It can demand that certain studies be made; it can consult

with its self-chosen experts; it can examine hearsay evidence.
The courts can do none of these things.

- 46
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As is apparent, no consistency can be anticipated as
different courts or juries in different jurisdictions apply even
the same test, much less the different ones noted above.

Each

test adopted by courts using the case-by-case approach is consistent
in one regard, however:

its disregard of the importance of the

fact that prescription medications are marketed only £ffi physicians,
and only for use by them in light of the warnings and indications
set forth in the drug's labeling.
Neither the FDA nor physicians would even begin to evaluate the societal benefit of a drug without considering what warnings its label contained. For instance, consider the case of a
product which is generally safe for use by most persons at reasonable doses for reasonable periods, but which may pose somewhat
more risk if given to the elderly, or if used for more than a certain period of days or at an elevated dosage.

Are these matters

appropriate only for consideration in drawing up warnings and indications for use so that the physician can determine when the drug
might or might not be useful?

Or are they not also matters which

should be considered in evaluating the productfs design?

A case-

by-case approach simply provides no adequate guidance as to how
and when such warnings are to be considered.
E.

The Case-By-Case Approach Simply Cannot Be Implemented As A Practical Matter In The Case Of Complex
Drugs Such As Halcion
The problems discussed in the preceding sections in them-

selves provide a sufficient basis to reject a case-by-case application of Comment k. Equally important, due perhaps to gaps in briefing, the courts cited by plaintiffs simply failed to consider the
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practical impossibility of actually undertaking a risk-benefit
analysis of the ••design" of a prescription drug.
Indeed, ££££l's labeling of the Comment k determination
as a "mini-trial11 was particularly inapt-

A brief hearing may

have appeared feasible for the oral polio vaccine in Kearl, but it
is quite impractical when considering complex products such as
Halcion. A hearing on the "design" of Halcion would be not a minitrial but a maxi-trial. and a procedural nightmare.
The magnitude of the factual inquiry cannot be understood
in a vacuum.

This Court should be aware of the basic facts of

Halcion*s development and approval for marketing.

That evidence,

a summary of which is included in Tab A of the Appendix,43 shows
that Upjohn began testing Halcion in animals in the late 1960's,
more than twelve years before it was first marketed in the United
States.

In 1970 Upjohn filed an IND permitting testing of Halcion

on humans.

After six years of research, Upjohn filed an NDA for

Halcion in 1976. There followed six more years of research, extensive testing by independent researchers, and detailed, page-bypage analysis of the NDA by tens of FDA scientists.

An Advisory

Committee of outside experts also reviewed the evidence supporting
Halcion.

Only in 1982, after submission of up to 150 volumes of

data covering numerous clinical trials on over 5,000 human subjects,
was Halcion approved for marketing.

43. This summary is based on public documents and the record in
this case. It is offered because this Court cannot fairly be asked
to make the important policy decisions raised by this certification
without some context about the extensive approval process involved
with an FDA-approved drug.

- 48
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Moreover, since 1982# 50 to 100 additional volumes of
data have been submitted and many additional human subjects have
been studied in clinical trials. The FDA and an Advisory Committee
of independent scientists have thoroughly reviewed Halcion and
again determined it may be marketed with appropriate labeling.
It would simply be impossible, as a practical matter,
for a court or jury to fairly or accurately reanalyze the kind and
magnitude of data considered by the FDA. Moreover, it is absolutely
appropriate for a Court to consider such procedural and practical
obstacles to a case-by-case application of Comment k, for an impractical or infeasible policy will not redound to the benefit of either
plaintiffs or society.
This point was well made recently in Smith v. Eli Lilly
& Co,. 137 111. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990), a prescription drug
case concerning whether Illinois should adopt some form of "market
share liability."

In rejecting this novel theory, Smith reviewed

"the experience of trial courts in California which earlier had been
instructed to apply the market share theory," Id. at 337-38,
stating:
The trial judge in Los Angeles expressed exasperation
with the task of attempting to formulate market shares
after spending over four weeks examining the DES market
. . . The judge then went on to criticize those who
developed the market share theory because of their obvious
lack of trial experience or knowledge as to what would
go into proving a case based on the theory.
Similarly, here, even were the case-by-case approach
adopted by some other courts theoretically justified (and it is
not), and even if courts could agree on a consistent test to be
applied

(and they do not), such an approach is simply not a
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practical undertaking.

The resulting factual/legal inquiries will

not be mini-trials, but "maxi-trial" headaches.

They would serve

only to prejudice the jury or court, and to cause delay and expense
as days or weeks of technical reanalysis of the FDA's approval
process was undertaken.

For this practical reason, as well as for

the policy reasons previously identified, Comment k should apply
to all prescription drugs.

For the reasons stated herein Petitioner The Upjohn Company respectfully requests this Court to answer the questions certified to it by stating that (1) Utah adopts Comment k to Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A; (2) Utah applies Comment k and the principles it embodies to all FDA-approved prescription drugs for important reasons of public policy, and (3) there is no need to reach
subquestions B and C.

If such questions were reached, however,

Upjohn suggests that a court rather than a jury should determine
the Comment k issue, based on evidence about risks at issue in
this case (not hypothetical risks) and the benefits the drug offers.
Dated this 5th day of February, 1991.
&£{/?«* [)~$t<7t/t-^
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION
ILO MARIE GRUNDBERG, individually,
and JANICE GRAY, as personal
representative of the Estate
of Mildred Lucille Coats,
Deceased,

-CERTIFICATION ORDER
TO UTAH SUPREME COURT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE UPJOHN COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation,

U.S. District Court
Civil No. 89-C-274G

Defendant.
Pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, this court acting sua sponte requests the Honorable
Supreme Court of Utah to answer the question of law certified
herein.

As more particularly set forth below, the question

certified is a controlling question of law in the above entitled
case, and moreover, it involves a significant public policy
issue.

The United States District Court which is certifying this

question has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over this
case, and the law of the State of Utah is the law to be applied.
The courts of the State of Utah, including the Utah Supreme
Court, have not previously addressed this question.

It is

believed that the question certified will not unduly interfere
with the Utah Supreme Court's regular functioning or be
inconsistent with the timely and orderly development of the
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decisional lav of the State.

In accordance with the said Rule

41, the following matters are set forth as part of this
Certification Order.
1. The question of lav to be answered: Whether Utah
adopts the "unavoidably unsafe products99 exception to strict
products liability as set forth in Comment k to Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)?1
1

Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides:
Comment k. Unavoidably unsafe products.
There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable
of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. ' These are especially common in
the field of drugs. An outstanding example
is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very
serious and damaging consequences when it is
injected. Since the disease itself
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both
the marketing and the use of the vaccine are
fully justified, notwithstanding the
unavoidable high degree of risk which they
involve. Such a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and
warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like,
many of which for this very reason cannot
legally be sold except to physicians, or
under the prescription of a physician. It is
also true in particular of many new or
experimental drugs as to which, because of
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience, there can be no assurance
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of
ingredients, but such experience as there is
justifies the marketing and use of the drug
notwithstanding a medically recognizable
risk. The seller of such products, again
with the qualification that they are properly

2
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Subquestion A; If Utah does adopt Comment k,
should FDA approved prescription drugs be deemed as a matter of
lav to have satisfied the "unavoidably unsafe" prerequisite to
the Comment k exception, or should that determination be made on
a case by case basis?
Subquestion B: If Utah does adopt Comment k, and
if it is further determined that its application to FDA approved
prescription drugs ought to be made on a case by case basis, is
such determination a threshold question for the trial court, or a
question properly to be presented to the jury?
Subquestion C; If it is determined that Comment k
is to be applied to FDA approved prescription drugs on a case by
case basis, is evidence pertaining to adverse side-effects from
the drug which were are not alleged to have been personally
suffered by the plaintiff relevant to the "unavoidably unsafe"
determination?

2. The queptipn certified j? ? controlling jsgue pf
law jn a case pepdjpg frefpr? th? certifying gpurti th? Vr\i%$$
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is
given, where the situation calls for it, is
not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use,
merely because he has undertaken to supply
the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk.

3
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States District Court for the District of Utah, entitled,
Grundbero v. UpJohn Co,. Civil No. 89-C-274 (assigned to Hon. J,
Thomas Greene).

The question certified arises in the context of

a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by defendant Upjohn that
has been fully briefed and argued and is currently under
advisement by the certifying court. Attached as Exhibit A to
this Certification Order is the Memorandum Decision and Order of
the certifying court which addresses related Motions for Partial
Summary Judgment.

3. There ?pp?ars tp be np controlling Vtah Ipw.
Utah adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts in Hahn v, Armco Steel Co,. 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah
1979) • However, Comment k to Section 402A has never been
addressed by the Utah Supreme Court, in the context of
prescription drugs or otherwise.
In payspn vy E-?. Squibl? f gpngi Ing»# 682 P.2d 832
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court considered a drug product
liability case, but the court found that it vas not necessary to
reach the strict liability issue because the court found that
there vas sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on
the -negligence claim. Id* at 837. Also, certain Utah statues
address the liability of product and drug manufacturers, but
these statutes do not directly address these Comment k issues.
See Utah Code Ann. iS 78-15-6(3)(1987) (rebuttable presumption
that product vas not defective if manufactured according to
4
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industry standards); 78-18-2 (1990 Supp.) (punitive damages
unavailable if drug was approved by FDA).

in p m e n Vt Leterle Laboratories* 676 F.supp. 233 (D.
Utah 1987), a case involving a DPT vaccine, the certifying court
predicted that the Utah Supreme Court likely would adopt Comment
k if given the opportunity, and accordingly held that Comment k
is the lav of Utah to be applied. Ifl. at 235. The court in
Patten specifically rejected the position that defendant Upjohn
urges here, and held that the "unavoidably unsafe9' element to
Comment k immunity from strict liability for prescription drugs
should be determined on a case by case basis.
The "unavoidably unsafe" element of Comment k is that
the product in question is made in the safest possible manner and
that its benefits outweigh its inherent risks. In its pending
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Upjohn does not argue that
factual disputes exist with regard to the unavoidably unsafe
requirement; rather, Upjohn takes the position that Halcion, like
all prescription drugs, satisfies this Comment k prerequisite as
a matter of law.
Defendant Upjohn argues that the court's holding in
Patten ought to be reconsidered in light of the California
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Superior Court. 751 P.2d 470
(Cal. 1988), which held that for reasons of public policy, all
FDA approved prescription drugs satisfy the Comment k unavoidably
unsafe requirement as a natter of law. Plaintiffs, on the other
5
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hand, urge that the Patten decision is still in accord with the
better position; Lt±.,

that a case by case determination should

be aade regarding the unavoidably unsafe Comment k requirement.
Both parties agree that the other prerequisite for the
Comment k defense, that the drug "was properly prepared and
accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities," must be
established by the drug manufacturer in each case.
3. States

Bre

divided

pn

^ a question certified.

States are divided on the question of whether
prescription drugs should be deemed to be "unavoidably unsafe" as
a matter, of law or whether this determination should be made on a
case by case basis (subquestion A certified).

See generally.

Annotation, Products Liability; What is an "Unavoidably Unsafe"
Product. 70 A.L.R.4th 16, 41-47 (1989 4 Supp. 1990).

Courts

supporting the view that all FDA approved prescription drugs are
"unavoidably unsafe" as a matter of law include: Lindsav V. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying
New York law); McElhanev v. Eli Lilly t Co.. 575 F.Supp. 228 (D.
S.D. 1983), AlllA,

739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984)? Fellows v. USV

Pharmaceutical Corp.. 502 F.Supp. 297 (D. Hd. 1980); Brown v.
Superior Court. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Kirk v. Michael Reese
HQSP.

t Med. Ctr.. 513 N.E,2d 387, 392-94 (111. 1987); McKee v.

K22££, 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v.
CJttpjiaii, 388 N.E.2d 541, 544-53 (Ind. App. 1979); T^hovitz v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 307 A.2d 449, 457-59 (Pa. Super.
6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1973).
Courts following the view that the Comment k
"unavoidably unsafe" requirement should be made on a case by case
basis with regard to prescription drugs include: Graham v. Wveth
Laboratories. 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'o. 666 F.Supp.
1483 (D. Kan. 1987) (applying Xansas law); Hill v. Searle
Laboratories. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Arkansas
law); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 642 F.2d 652 (1st
Cir. 1981)(applying New Hampshire law); Allen v. G.D. Searle &
££., 708 F.Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); Kpcjembft yt Gtpt Searle t
£2., 680 F.Supp. 1293, modified. 695 F.Supp. 432 (0. Minn. 1988);
Topey vt Lederje LabpratPfjes, 732 p.2d 297 (Idaho 1987); Felflman
V, Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984); yhltf y, Wyeth
Laboratories. Inc.. 533 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1988); Castrinanano v.
E.R. Souibb & Sons. Inc.. 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988); Gaston v.
Hunter. 588 P.2d 326, 340 (Ariz. App. 1978). £e_e. also Note, A.
Prescription for Applying Strict Liability; Not all Druos Deserve
Comment K Immunization. 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 809 (1989).
There is also an apparent split of authority as to
whether the Comment k defense is a court or jury question
(subquestion B certified).
4.

See id.. 21 Ariz. St. L.J. at 819-20.

Facts relevant to the determination of the Question

certified;
Plaintiff Ilo Grundberg is the daughter of Mildred
Lucille Coats, who died at age 83, after being shot by plaintiff
7
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on June 19, 1988. The other plaintiff, Janice Gray, is the
personal representative of Ms. Coats* estate. Plaintiffs allege
in their Complaint that Ms. Grundberg shot her mother as a direct
and proximate result of her ingestion of the drug Halcion, vhich
is a prescription drug manufactured by defendant UpJohn. Halcion
is used for the treatment of insomnia, characterized by
difficulty in falling asleep, frequent nocturnal awakenings,
and/or early morning awakenings. Halcion is the common or trade
name of the drug "triazolam91 (generic name).
Triazolam was initially introduced into the world

*

market in Belgium in 1977. On May 4, 1976, Upjohn submitted a
new drug application to the United States Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA11) to market triazolam (Halcion) in the
United States. The FDA approved Upjohn9s Halcion application on
November 15, 1982. Since that time, defendant Upjohn has
manufactured and distributed Halcion to pharmacies, hospitals and
physicians for dispensation by prescription only.

Zn 1988

Halcion was distributed by Upjohn in the State of Utah and
throughout the United States, and in more than 70 other nations
around the world.
Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Grundberg took a .5
milligram dose of Halcion on the day that she shot her mother,
and that this dosage was recommended by her physician and was
consistent with UpJohn*s recommended dosage. Plaintiffs allege
that Ms. Grundberg shot her mother while in a state of Halcion
8
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(triazolam)-induced intoxication, which allegedly included many
side effects, such as depression, psychosis, depersonalization,
aggressive assaultive behavior and homicidal compulsion.
Plaintiffs1 Complaint states several causes of action,
including Common Law Negligence (Count I ) , and Strict Liability
(Count II). 2 In connection with these claims, plaintiffs allege
that defendant Upjohn knew or should have known that Halcion
caused the adverse side effects that were allegedly suffered by
plaintiff Grundberg.

Plaintiffs further allege that Upjohn "did

not adequately design, synthesize, test, manufacture, and inspect
the Drug Halcion (triazolam),3 and willfully, recklessly, and/or
negligently failed or refused to give adequate instructions,
warnings and advice91 regarding such side effects to plaintiff
Grundbergfs physician.4

Complaint Jf B.VIII, D.I., E.V.

2

Plaintiffs' other legal causes of action are set forth in Count III, Breach of Expressed
and Implied Warranties (dismissed), and Count V, Wrongful Death. Counts IV, VI and VII are
damage claims.
3

At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs clarified that plaintiffs only claim that
Halcion was defectively designed by Upjohn. Plaintiffs do not claim that a •manufacturing
defect" occurred, Le., that plaintiff Grundberg ingested a "bad batch" of Halcion or that
somehow a harmful ingredient was inadvertently made part of the specific Halcion pills that
were taken by plaintiff Grundberg. Accordingly, allegations or references in the Complaint to
manufacturing defects, as opposed to design defect claims, should be considered stricken from
plaintiffs* Complaint

Plaintiffs also alleged that Upjohn failed to give adequate warnings about Halcion to
plaintiff Grundberg, plaintiff Gnmdberg's family, the public at large, hospitals and Pharmacists.
However, in connection with a prior motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendant,
the court dismissed all of plaintiffs* failure to warn claims except as they pertain' to plaintiff

9
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Plaintiffs also allege that the dosage of Halcion recommended by
Upjohn and consumed by plaintiff Grundberg was excessive and
dangerous and was the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff
Grundberg*s mother, Mildred Lucille Coats.
5. Additional Reasons for Acceptance of this
Certification Order: The question and subquestions presented are
of major importance in products liability actions against drug
manufacturers. The issues presented are matters of first
impression to the Utah Supreme Court and they are likely to recur
repeatedly in federal courts applying Utah lav and in state court
proceedings also.

In terms of comity, this court believes that

the Supreme Court of Utah should be given the opportunity to
decide this matter of Utah lav rather than having this court
address the matter in this diversity of citizenship case and
render an "Eirie guess."
A six week jury trial in this case is scheduled to
commence on April 29, 1991.
The necessary briefing relative to this matter has
already been done by counsel, and it is believed that counsel for
the parties vould be in a position to stipulate to an accelerated
briefing schedule and presentation of arguments before the court.

Grundberg's physician. £ee Order of March 11,1990f issued by Honorable Judge David K.
Winder who was previously assigned to this case. This ruling was an application of the "learned
intermediary doctrine* under Utah law. geg Barson v. E.R. Souibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832,
835 (Utah 1984).

10
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This court respectfully requests, if the Honorable
Supreme of Utah exercises its discretion to accept the question
herewith certified, that the court set forth in its order of
acceptance an expedited schedule for the filing of briefs and for
oral argument as contemplated in Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
DATED: December

l°f , 1990.

THOMAS GREENE
IITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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